



THE MAIN GOALS OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE

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Abstract: The Yalta Conference stands as the place where the foundations of the new world order were laid. In the middle of the 17th century, the results of the Thirty Years' War were summed up. This conference was not a peace conference, but a conference. The decisions of the Yalta Conference of 1945 are not numbered the same. But their arbitrary interpretation and desire to act on individual events of several centuries that followed have little in common with a true understanding of the lessons of Yalta, because each of the stages of the historical evolution of the international system relations remains in the treasury of human experience their achievements. The conference of the heads of the three allied states - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - took place in 1945 from February 4 to 11. At Yalta, the leaders of the three countries demonstrated their strength, demonstrated a sense of time - their brains were extremely clearly defined - and outlined the conditions for the existence of a new system. The level of satisfaction with the post-war international stability was of primary importance in the system, the claims of the members of the "privileged club" to restore the results of the war and victory. These ideas found expression in the dialogue between V. Churchill and IV. Stalin at the Big Three breakfast in Tehran on November 30, 1943. Then the British Prime Minister

“...World governance should be concentrated in the hands of completely satisfactory and non-claiming nations.



Stalin argued that world power should be concentrated in the hands of powerful nations.

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After the Second World War, one of the main goals of the conference was the defeat of Germany. In the process of developing the main principles of the post-war world - devices. The main nodes of contradictions within the framework of the project were identified. The contradiction between universalism and the policy of spheres of influence and the main reasons for the compromise. IV Stalin, F. Roosevelt and V. Churchill in Yalta, politicians of the 21st century. 2010 marks the 65th anniversary of the Crimean War (Yalta) conference of the heads of the three allied states - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held from February 4 to 11, 1945.

Yalta stands in the ranks of cities formed as a result of the Second World War, along with cities such as Münster (Westphalia), where the results of the Thirty Years' War of the mid-17th century were summed up and the foundations of the Westphalian system of international relations were laid. Like Vienna, where the changes in Europe were summed up, and Paris and Washington, the windows of the world of the 18th and early 19th centuries, were located. The events of the First World War created a new world system - Versailles-Washington. Meanwhile, the meeting of the "big three" in Yalta in 1945 was not a final peace conference, but a conference. The consequences of the war and the victory in the war, of course, were sealed by the decisions made and the "Yalta" configuration, or the "Yalta-Potsdam" system of international relations, the foundations of which are well known. The conference communiqué began with the section "The Defeat of Germany". "It declared that "Nazi Germany is doomed to destruction" and that "the German people are desperate to continue their cooperation. Resistance will only increase the price of defeat." The most rapid breakthrough that the Allied powers have achieved is through combined military operations, the exchange of information, fully coordinated and planned in detail "the time, size and new and even more powerful



blows will be delivered to the heart. Germany will be restored with our troops and air forces, now, west, north and south." The parties agreed on a common policy and implementation plan: full implementation of the terms of unconditional surrender of the German occupation zones; coordinated management and control through a special body consisting of the commanders-in-chief of the three powers with their seats in Berlin; providing France, if it so wishes, with a body to supervise the occupation zones and areas.

The powers of the anti-Hitler coalition stated that their "mutual ultimate goal was to eliminate German militarism and to create guarantees that Nazism and Germany would never again be capable of disrupting the peace of the whole world."

A number of measures were envisaged for this, including the "complete disarmament, demilitarization and division of Germany" as well as the collection of compensation, the amount of which and the methods of payment of which were to be determined by a special commission in Moscow.

To maintain peace and security, the Allies decided to create a general international organization to ensure and prepare its Charter A conference was convened in San Francisco on April 25, 1945. United Nations. It was announced. The Security Council of this organization will operate on the principle of permanent members and will support the proposal of the United States and Great Britain to admit to initial membership on the principle of unanimity the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR organizations.

In the "Declaration on Liberated Europe," the Allies declared that the powers "coordinate the policies of the three powers and their joint action in solving the political and economic problems of a liberated modern Europe in accordance with democratic principles."

In the complex Polish question, the parties agreed to reorganize the Provisional Government of Poland "on a larger scale with the introduction of democratic figures from Poland itself and Poles abroad. " The eastern state border was drawn along the



"Kurzon Line" with a five- to eight-kilometer retreat from it in some areas in favor of Poland, and in the north and west it was forced to receive "a significant increase in territory."

On the issue of Yugoslavia, they proposed the creation of an alliance. The Provisional United National Government, the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, and the royal governments in exile, as well as the Provisional Parliament.

decided to establish a permanent mechanism for consultations between the three foreign ministers.

According to the agreement signed by the leaders of the three countries, the USSR undertook to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, provided that the status quo was maintained (Mongolian People's Republic); restoration of rights belonging to Russia, violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 (return of the southern part of the island to the Soviet Union. Sakhalin and all adjacent islands); internationalization - provision of the Dairen trading port with privileges in the interests of the Soviet Union and restoration of the port lease Arthur as a naval base of the USSR; joint operation of the East China Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, providing access to Dairen on the basis of the organization of the railways of the mixed Soviet-Chinese Community with the provision of priority interests of the Soviet Union (at the time it was assumed that China would retain full sovereignty in Manchuria. tet); transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union. The USSR expressed its readiness to conclude a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" with China. It provided assistance to it by its armed forces in the development of China's liberation from the Japanese yoke". Bilateral agreements were also signed at the conference. Decisions determining the procedure for treating prisoners of war and citizens of the participating states in the event of their release by the troops of the allied countries, as well as the conditions for their repatriation. In developing these provisions, IV Stalin, F. Roosevelt and V. Churchill solved a problem similar to that



which had existed in previous periods and still faces the state today. The determination of the principles and configuration by the state participants - the new international system in the conditions of changed relations - will take on the world powers. From this point of view, it seems useful. What they guided, what they led, and what remained a lesson for future generations of politicians, laid the foundations of a new international system.

This analysis is also important because the name "Yalta" has become a symbol once again actively burned in news reports, studies and research that show the process of dismantling the existing system of international relations, sometimes even more clearly emphasizing the unilateral Yalta decisions. The famous American scientist and statesman Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that "Yalta has become a symbol of shame in terms of the formation of "changes in the post-war worldview ". At the same time, the President of France F. Mitterrand said that the countries of Eastern Europe should urgently join Western structures, because if they continue to be on the side of NATO and the European Union, then, in his opinion, this could lead to a new redistribution continent, a second Yalta". In line with the ideas expressed by the French, the assessment of the Czech President on the Yalta decisions was also heard in December 1996 at the OSCE Lisbon Summit when discussing common and comprehensive security problems for Europe in the 21st century. It was emphasized that the participants in the forum "provided a historic opportunity to eliminate the last remnants of the Yalta order and rebuild Europe as a family around the values on which our civilization was founded." In April 1997, the British newspaper Financial Times characterized the US-Russia summit as "a triumph for the American head of state at the highest level, Yeltsin and Clinton, over the Riga administration. In fact, it turned into a reverse Yalta. Instead of recognizing Russia's sphere of influence, Clinton achieved this by preserving the right of the Central and Eastern European countries to join the alliances of their own choosing." According to Newsweek magazine, which analyzed the results of George W. Bush's 2005 trip to Europe, if the visit of the president to the USA is remembered for anything, it was his "infuriating speech." In Riga, he blamed F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill.



At the Crimean summit in 1945, they agreed to “give up Eastern Europe” “to the Soviets.” Georgian President M. Saakashvili said in an interview with the Washington Post on May 10, 2005, “For 60 years, Yalta has been a symbol of betrayal and betrayal. As a result, the conclusion reached in this sleepy town in Great Britain has turned Tanzania, the Soviet Union and the United States into slaves of brutal tyranny, hundreds of millions of people.”

Of course, the decisions of the Yalta Conference of 1945 are not numbered the same. But their arbitrary interpretation and desire to act on individual events of several centuries that followed have little in common with a true understanding of the lessons of Yalta, because each of the stages of the historical evolution of the international system of relations remains in the treasury of human experience and their achievements.

The confirmation of the operation of the eternal principle that any international system is formed by the dominant forces in the international system, for the implementation of which the local hierarchy of the state, first of all,

personal interests, concentration of organization and control over the processes of interaction of all other participants in the system, IV Stalin, F. Roosevelt and V. Churchill represented the most powerful states of their time, demonstrating their superiority in the main parameters of power in the conditions of world war. They represented empires. IV Stalin is an empire that suffered huge losses, but you - thanks to the blow for the victory of the peoples who recognized the threat to their national existence, united in this struggle and inspired by hopes for a brighter future, which was caused by the rigidity of the totalitarian regime. He reached his position with brilliant victories, his army crossed half of Europe and stood at the mouth of Berlin, which shaped the face of the post-war world.

F. Roosevelt envisioned a new kind of empire, one with unprecedented economic power and influence on an international scale, rapidly moving from the periphery of the world to the level of a great power, and to realize its potential, the economic



openness of the world was required. This was the basis of the university's Salist approach to organizing a new world order.

W. Churchill defended the interests of the weakening classical partnership. The lonial empire, whose economy was destroyed by two world wars, colonial possessions demanded independence bridges and traditional methods of maintaining the balance of power Europe found itself in the past. Perhaps his task was the most difficult in the art of diplomacy, because he had to get an answer to the question: "In Crimea, is it possible for personal diplomacy to hold back the impersonal onslaught of history and the sudden strengthening of the Soviet Union. "The military power of the Soviet Union?"

At Yalta, the leaders of the three countries demonstrated their power, demonstrated a sense of time - their brains, which were extremely clearly defined - allocated the conditions for the existence of a new system. International relations - 50 years. President F. Roosevelt Gal: "...Our task is to ensure peace for at least 50 years" and "sought to build a new world, free from injustice and violence". IV Stalin also spoke about 50 years of peaceful development, but his sense of time was sharper. " ... As long as we are all alive, there is nothing to fear," he said. The hall is for partners-rivals. - We will not allow dangerous waste dreams between us. We will not allow a new aggression against any of our countries. But 10 years will pass or maybe less, and we will disappear. A new generation is coming, a feeling that it has not experienced everything that we have experienced, many issues will probably be considered differently from us. What are the words? — And then the children?. They connected this time, in fact, with the life of a political generation. And the Yalta experience shows that there is a certain model of systems. The state order is limited to two generations: as long as the creators of the system and their followers are alive, it will exist; with their departure, the tendency to revise the foundations of the international system is growing.

I. V. Lenin based on? What led to the compromise between Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill in solving military issues and designing the post-war world? The



dominance of political realism played a key role in the ideology, the shift from general calculations to special geopolitical calculations. The essence of the tasks of the wartime period was strengthened by this vector in the activities of the "big three": a common enemy and special operations against it; planning military operations, actions and measures to ensure their implementation; the task of restoring the emerging post-war problems and forming a new balance of powers that would not allow for revenge by the defeated.

The influence of these circumstances was reinforced by the worldview of each of the members of the "big three". According to one of F. Roosevelt's closest advisers, S. Wells, "he knew about the abyss separating Western and Eastern civilizations. There are terrible differences in language, religion, politics, ideology and culture. However, he was convinced of the possibility of cooperation. svate... He knew that Marxism declared a brutal war on capitalism. ism, but he did not believe that ideology could determine the actions of people. The war of ideologies, according to Roosevelt, is the main name is limited to book discussions" [quote by:.

IV Stalin, a politician, in terms of his general approach to foreign policy issues, was undoubtedly a "geopolitical thinker". He assessed the state of affairs in terms of territories, borders and spheres of influence. In order to exert the necessary influence on the conditions of the country's relative backwardness, a number of power parameters were set, the Soviet Union could only clearly define its external territories in a certain area, provided with armed forces. This desire led to the emergence of the desire to establish spheres of influence. "The Kremlin ...", said the famous American historian A. Schlesinger Jr., thought only about the sphere of its interests... ».

The political pragmatism of the British Prime Minister W. Churchill found its most striking reflection in two fundamental steps that made him "great" - the implementation of any concessions to create a British-American alliance in the war and in the post-war world, as well as the clear sub- support for the Soviet Union's



fight against Germany, which was the first stone in the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.

In the conditions of the end of the war, the geostrategy of the empire is objective. The main goal was to find a balance of power between the members of the "receiving" "privileged club", especially in Europe, protecting itself from the influence of the victorious states on the territories where their troops were stationed, creating conditions for their future protection, and the possibility of influencing the areas of responsibility of other governments. Restoring their security at the expense of those who had lost it and the economy. In the process of solving these important problems, the participants of the "Big Three" left an excellent example for generations of their approach to analyzing and implementing their geopolitical interests. states and partners-rivals.

F. Roosevelt was very worried about the possibility of further penetration of Soviet troops into Europe. Already in the first period

Meetings with IV. Stalin on February 4, even before the opening of the conference, He began to check and asked the marshal: "One of the members of his entourage argued with him and Roosevelt whether or not a "Berlin or Manila was taken first ". The president anxiously discussed the future balance of power in Europe. After all, already in the next - The next day, American troops were to come from three sides began an attack on the Philippine capital and reached its outskirts. But F. Roosevelt was primarily interested in Berlin and its prospects. Soviet offensive, because on the Western Front, the Anglo-American allies had not yet overcome the Siegfried Line, crossed the Rhine River, and General D. Eisenhower regrouped their units, planning to launch the first offensive on February 8, the second - a few days later, and a major offensive - in March.

IV Stalin understood the president's concerns. "...Mani -“ La will be captured before Berlin,” he assured F. Roosevelt. But twice more at the first session the American president “ Big Three ” emphasized this issue. “Previously, the allies fought at a



great distance from each other, ”said General A. I. Antonova later reported on the January offensive of the Soviets Russian troops. - Now Germany has become small, and therefore it is of particular importance “There is closer communication between the headquarters of the three countries”. IV Stalin later called this approach correct, noting that some representatives of the allied command “Soviet troops will not stop the offensive until the end of March ” . He concluded that the Allied intentions to continue the investigation were: “We... will continue if the weather permits and the roads are clear, their attack. “We can march.” F. Roosevelt reacted immediately. However, “now is the time to be more cautious and closely coordinate the actions of the Allied forces,” said the “General War Plans.” He was supported by W. Churchill . Military Matters were referred to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration. He concluded that the Allied intentions to continue the investigation were: “We... will continue if the weather permits and the roads are clear, their attack. “We can march.” F. Roosevelt reacted immediately. However, “now is the time to be more cautious and closely coordinate the actions of the Allied forces,” said the “General War Plans.” He was supported by W. Churchill. Military issues were submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration. But IV Stalin understood the main thing: the Western allies did not allow the further advance of the Soviet troops, as a result of which the balance of power would change in favor of the Soviet Union. “Stalin was burdened with thoughts about whether to continue the operation,” writes D. Clemens. to continue according to the plan [the operational pause between reaching the Oder and taking the offensive, which was not planned. — S.Yu.] or not. At the opening of the conference, he hesitated. The conference was ready, sent the army to continue the offensive, and at the same time put obstacles in their way. In the process At the conference, Stalin twice, on February 2 and 4, gave the order to begin the Berlin offensive. Then, on February 6, he canceled the operation for full negotiations with the allies to coordinate the army on February 4 and political negotiations on February 5”. He delayed the order for military reasons, and the Western Allied forces moved in to restore parity.



weighed in the depth of the advance and was ready to defeat Germany together with the Soviet troops as members of the coalition. These actions of IV Stalin also tried to the maximum extent not to reduce the possibility of concluding a separate agreement with Germany and the Western allies. The main parameters of the balance of forces during the military defeat of the Third Reich were determined and on its basis the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition completed the victory over fascism in three months.

the “Big Three” there was a demonstration. This is another vivid example of geopolitical analysis. After the report of General A. I. Antonov F. Roosevelt unexpectedly asked: “Does the Soviet government intend to rebuild? “German railways to a wider gauge?”. This seemingly insignificant question had a deep geopolitical meaning. The president was interested in the material real possibilities of the Soviet side to strengthen their dominance in the territories liberated by the Red Army. The rias of European states. After all, one of the most important principles of geopolitics says: “Whoever dominates the issue of access to this region and most likely will win in geo-political and economic terms”.

The attitude of the Soviet representatives is also interesting. General AI An- Tonov replied: “The Germans are of little use. “Railways must be restored in a number of important areas,” then corrected himself: “...The Soviet command is only engaged in re-stitching a minimum number of routes in order to ensure the supply of Soviet troops.” Feeling, perhaps, the meaning of the hidden question, IV Stalin concluded: “...Most of the railways are unpaved. Changing the route of the railways “The military command does this with great reluctance.” Indeed, the re-stitching of the railways from the western track (1438 mm) to the Soviet (1524 mm) was carried out on a significant scale and not only in the direction of military areas, but also in places where there were large industrial enterprises. It is difficult to find accurate data on re-stitching. Privo- Figures vary and range from 22 to 32 thousand kilometers. The period from December 1944 to the end of spring 1945, when the railway tracks were restored and rebuilt.



Another event was related to such an important geopolitical category as borders. Much has been written about the debate on the borders of Poland. In this context, we are interested in the problem of its western borders. At a meeting on February 6, IV Stalin said: "...The western border of Poland should pass along the West Neisse" and asked F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill to support him in this matter. The next day, the allies received a message about the existing Soviet proposals. The American researcher wrote that "in Yalta, Stalin suddenly appeared before Roosevelt and Churchill with a newly drawn map. He called for the demand in the interests of the Lublin Poles of the still-Lusatia, or rather, the West Neisse as a continuation in the southern direction. The line along the Oder River is the new western border. At the same time, he fulfilled his secret promises made in July 1944. to his clients in Lublin».

the global future presented to the world by the "big three": a quick end to the war; coalitions in the form of forming (or preserving) spheres of influence, taking into account the interests of the major powers - Germany and Japan; lasting peace for two generations; regulation of emerging conflicts through an international security organization - the United Nations.

Yalta became a successful example of great people's cooperation. Java - the USSR, whose way of life is built differently from the Western value system and which has proven its right to remain in the "privileged club" with weapons and amazing power, military successes, - among the greats of world politics, dividing the system of international relations, including through the UN, which first of all united the victorious powers, sought to solve the problems of universal human security, as well as to stabilize the international system that suits them.

The Yalta decisions were an example of a particularly successful combination of the rights of great powers and the principle of democratic rule, which was embodied in the UN structure, with the members of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and also provided, at least in the activities of this organization, a mechanism for discussing and involving emerging problems, drawing wide public



attention to them. The path that has been taken since then shows that the problem of the combination of the interests of great powers and small states remains active. Tual. also rightly noted that "the principle of sovereignty, which in previous centuries had determined the relations between a very limited number of European countries, has spread throughout the world, and the international system of relations has become universal. The principle of sovereign equality of States has become a fundamental element of the international system, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. legal rights. The creation of the United Nations marked the transition from the old system, in which the limitation of sovereignty had become a practice, to a new one, which limited the possibility of using force against a sovereign state, based on the law of the strong.

is important to recognize the sovereignty of former European colonies. has significantly expanded the circle of sovereign states."

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